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THE REVIVAL OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISMS
The slow but sure revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe
can best be analyzed by considering its two major causes. first,
changes in external influences and, second, domestic developments.
T
The primary external influence in Eastern Europe remains the
Soviet Union. One of the resualts of the Second World War was that
Eastern Europe fell into the Soviet sphere of influence; and, al-
though to a lesser extent, it continues there until this day. At
first, under Stalin, Eastern Europe increasingly became something
close to a part of the Soviet Union. One of the tasks of his suc-
cessors was to begin an imperial readjustment, in which Eastern
Europe was the lesser problem; China, we now know, was the major
one.
Paradoxically, it was largely not in spite of but because of
the 1956 Polish October and Hungarian Revolution that by the late
nineteen fifties Jrushchev seemed. to be doing quite well in Eastern
Europe. (We did not know then what we do now: he was already
doing badly with China,) Khrushchev's program of de-Stalinization
probably strengthened the Communist regime, at least for the pres-
ent, within the Soviet Union, and it to some extent helped the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. (For example, between 1953 andI
1957, and again after 1960, it greatly iproved rltions between
Moscow and Belgrade)
But for many reasons, including in particular the d.isintegra-3
tion of relations between Moscow and Peking, this reconsolidation
in Eastern Europe of the late fifties proved to be short-lived3
(The point at which Moscow and Peking felt that a move toward a
break rather than toward a reconciliation was probabie was, at the
latest, in 1959, and probably In 1958 3
Although few in the West then realized thi the ieaders of
Eastern Europe mcust have. Theyalso realized that, as a resuIt of
the Sino-Soviet dispute and of the gradua revival of nationalism
in Eastern Europe., the dream of Marx and, Lenin of proletarian inter-
nationalism, already 1ransformed by Sta in into Soviet national
communism, was giving way tc the re-emergence of the interests of
1. Zbigniew Brzezinski., The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed. (New York:
Praeger, 1961); Williaim E, Griffith ed . Comnism. in Europe .
and II (Cambridge, Mass . The McLT. Press, 1964 and 1965)
2. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sinc-Soviet Confict 1956-l96i
(Princeton. N. J Princeton Tniversily Press, 1962); Alexander
Dallin with Jonathan Harris and Grey Hodne-tt Diverr in Inerna-
tional Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969;
William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Canibridge, Mass. The
M.I.T. Press, 1964); and. WilIam O, riffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations
1964-1965.," unpublished paper prepared for the Conference on Sino-
Soviet Relations and Arms Control sponsored by Harvard University
under contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, August 30-September )4 ,
1965.
the East European nations and states rather than those of the
international Communist movement or of the Soviet Union itself.
At the same time, and particularly after the Cuban crisis,3
Khrushchev (and., it now appears, his successors) were abandoning
their dream of the continued. "permanent revolution from above" of
Soviet society and. therefore of East European society as well.
They apparently foresee its replacement by legitimization of the
Communist regimes through economic accomplishments 4 This will
give them more popular support; but one wonder, as many in the So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe must wonder as well, what justifica-
tion there is for Communist party rule when the economy not the
party's "permanent revoluti.on," is the center of society.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has led, along with increased nation-
alism in Eastern Europe, to a gradual albeit unequal decline of
Soviet authority in the area.' This decline has increased the
possibility of maneuver of the East European state and party leader-
ships both within the Sino-Soviet context and, for many of them,
with the West as well. One sees this most strikingly in the case
3. Griffith, The S]n-Soviet Rift, pp. 8-11 and 60-66.
4. Richard Lowenthal, "The Prospects for Pluralistic Com-
munism," Dissent, XII, I (Winter 1965).
5. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965," g cit.
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of Romania, and one can even already see it to some extent in the
case of such a hitherto Stalinist state as Czechoslovakia.
Other factors originatng from the West have also been sig-
nificant for East European developments - One is certainly the
great rise in the economic and. therefore cf the political power of
Western Europe, and in particular the more active East European
policies of France and West Germanyb Secondly, there was the
United States victory in the Cuban crisis, which went far, partic-
ularly in Romania, to convince the Communist leaderships in Eastern
Europe that history is at least for the present probably not on the
side of the Soviet Uniono
The unity of the international CommuniSt movement is gone,
split not only into two but many parts, and most probably irrevers-
ibly. The revival of Chinese territorial and, boundary ambitions
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union make its reversibility even less li 1Iore-
over, Mao Tse-tung and hs.- assocates are comitred to a long-range
attempt to depose the Soviet Union as the head of the international
Communist movement. This nation-state and ideological clash must
seem even more irreversible to the East European leaders than it
does to us.
Finally, a whole series of ethnic and boundary questions is
re-emerging in the Soviet Union, in China, and in Eastern Europe
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965)
itself. Two world wars started in Central Europe over still un-
solved and now reintensifying ethnic problems.
To the decline of Soviet authority and. the increasing power
and influence of the West in Eastern Europe, there is added a
declining fear on the part of the East European leaderships that
they need fear Western, or for that matter, Soviet intervention.
The successful defiance of Moscow by Romania has been only one of
its results. A whole series of domestic East European developments
reinforces these trends.
II
The three most important recent domestic developments in
Eastern Europe are the general. economic growth, the increasing
elite and mass nationalism, and the giving way of mass police ter-
ror to de-Stalinization and partial reform. These three develop-
ments have resulted in, first, a somewhat greater identification of
the East European regimes with the peoples of these countries (a
trend intensified by the regimes' declining identification with the
Soviet Union) and, secondly (in addition to a declining fear of
Western intervention) their declining need of Soviet troops to up-
hold their authority. However, there remain limits within which
Soviet hegemony would probably still be asserted--specifically, as
in Hungary in 1956, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or collapse of
a one-party Communist regime.
There was in Eastern Europe from 19 3 until 1956 a period
known as the thaw, which. cuiminated in and was reversed by the
Hungarian Revolution, giving way thereafter to a reconsolidation
of Communist power. Since about 1960, and more clearly since 1962,
a new thaw has begun in Eastern Europe. As compared with the thaw
there in the early fifties, this new thaw is first geographically
more inclusive: with the exception of Albania and Poland, it in
cludes to a greater ar lesse extent all East European states.
Secondly, it is les plitical ad literary and more nationalist
and economic in inspiration. Thirdly it centers less among crea-
tive Literary and revisionist intellectuals and more in the Communist
party and economic apparats
The new thaw .in economics has been caused primarily by the
growing complexity and Inefficiency of the East European economies.
This is most clearly the case with respect to East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, by far the mt industrialized of East European
states, their economic liberalization is much like what is occur-
ring, more slowly, in the Soviet Union itself, The increasing
development and complexity of their eccnomies makes increasingly
necessary, if only for the sake of efficiency, major reforms in
7 William E. Griffith, The East European Thaw, 1953-1956
(Cambridge, Mass.,: The M.L TO Press, forthcoming).
8. Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962). (
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central planning in the direction of decentralization and of the
introduction of a rational price system and of something close to
a market economy. This problem, in turn, has led to an increasing
conflict between the economic and, managerial technicians, whose
primary goal is economic efficiency, and the old-line party
apparatchiki, whose coercive and, propagandistic policies were use-
ful in the period of rapid economic growth before a certain plane
of industrialilzation was reached but whose same skills are increas-
ingly counter-producti've in increasingly complex economies.
This economic thaw was set off, or at least was greatly aided.,
by the beginning of the so-called Liberman discussion in the Soviet
Union and. by the worsening of economic conditions in Czechoslovakia
and East Germany. The proposals for decentralization of Professor
Liberman of Kharkov, first introduced publicly in an article in
Pravda in September 1962. involved decentralization and greater
7 LOpriority for consumer goods.l They have been fairly rapidly ac-
companied by, and, In part have probably given a convenient excuse
for allowing to break through, similar but more far-reaching devel-
opments in Eastern Europe. These developments have been accompanied
9. John M. Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern Europe,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIII, 2 (January 1965), pp- 331-348.
10. Marshall I. Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet
Union," ibid., XLI, 3 (April 1963), pp. 498-512.
by some sh 1 It E Eropean trade toward. Wesern Europe, particu-
tarl v y Rmas a as- by an increasn f ood of tourists
from t-he We-7t paW tcar ly Western Europe. a development encouraged
by the East Europea regiie Iargeiy for economic reasonsa Finally,
Buchares a ocked Khruhchtev" - attempt to push forward. much more
apidy t-i tegratior of East Europec
J trn now the nationa st elemeCts, th second major fac-
tor in This new thaw, Three imfportant points stand. out first,
naiali sm i enemic in Eatern Europe and it naturally revives
w e n p aant .acens; second, the revival of
na onast tb uugh and ac tin on the part of the Comimunist leaders
more important than, al hiough tn part induced by, that of their
fE *rde.,sses of the populat ion and, third, as before
Fhe r vng Easi Eurcpean oatnalta-ms are often rutuall y hos+ile
T'he Ea-s Eurpean Cmunist leaders now recognize that neither the
ineraiea oau suvemnt nr the SovTer Un-on but their
on t 5' tsare the re raewonk of power. Once these nationalist
f gso resl. iIn somf differences with, or, in Romania,
p!ar a d - ta' ': 3, : te pc: 1,: t hthr developments then become
Since -ny Eas European sate which even partially opposes
the So:e' Uninr cani no lnger as compleely as before rely upon
ii Gri ffith, The Sinc-SovietRift, pp1 137-142 and 185-186;
and John Michael Mont Bas IEackground and Origin-s of the Rumanian
Dispute wi.th Ccmecn," Sovet Studies, XVI, 2 (October 1963)
pp. 12h15'>
Soviet support, it must therefore necessarily try to generate more
popular support at home and also, if only minimally, to reinsure
itself with some other external power. With the exception of Albania,
where the power is China, with all other East European states this
has resulted in the improvement of relations with the West. The
combination of the necessity for more popular support at home and
for improved relations with the West tends to result in concessions
to the population of the country concerned and to a gradual decline
in the domestic and external extremism of the party apparat0
The new thaw in Eastern Europe has not been confined only to
nationalist and. economic developments. There have been, varying
from country to country, consid-erable changes also in the cultural
sphere, both with respect to decline in the rigid limits of social-
ist realism (for example, a greater tolerance for abstract art) and
also to a greater degree of Western cultural influence at both the
elite and mass levels: creative literature, for example, and
Western jazz.
III
Turning to the individual East European countries, one must
first attempt to set up some categories of analysis, Any categories,
for eight countries as increasingly different as these eight are,
always oversimplify the analysis, but there do seem to be some
general, approximate common patterns.
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First, one may consider the leadership's domestic policies-,
whether or not it is neo-Stalinist (Iceo, rigid) or reformist or
even revisionist, and. in addition, the direction in which it is
moving. Second, one may consider its policy toward the West:.
whether it is conciliatory or hostile. Third, one may consider its
attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, the major current foreign
policy factor affecting East European countries; within this con-
text one can consider a regime as either moderate, that is to say,
opposed to a total and definitive break between Moscow and Peking,
or extremist, that is to say, in favor of such. a break or, minimally,
in favor of the most extreme Soviet moves toward it.
First, with the partial exception of Romania and YugoslaviaI
there has been no major change in the allegiance of East European
states with respect to the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1.960. There
have been, however, significant minor changes. They may be summed
up by saying that Soviet influence in Eastern Europe has consist-
ently declined, and the influence of other Communist parties, in
particular the Chinese (in Aalbania only), the Italian, and (although
decreasingly) the Yugoslav has Increased. Above al1, the relative
independence of the East European parties has increased since about
1959; indeed recent research has indicated that the Romanian devia-
12
tion can be dated back in published material to 1958. Second,
since 1960 the differentiation among these states has greatly
12. Montias, "Background and, Origins," ]cc cit
increased. Third, although there has nct yet been a formal split
in the international Communist movement there has been a de facto
break between the Soviet Union and China, a development which is
probably the major foreign policy factor influencing the decisions
of all East European leaderships.
IV
In considering developments in the Individual East European
states, one may best begin from the south, with the two most excep-
tional ones: Albania and Yugoslavia. The most significant thing
about Albania is that for the first time since the withdrawal of
the Mongols in the fourteent h century, a European state is under
the influence of a major Far Eastern power: not just a traditional
Far Eastern power, not even just a modernizing expansionist empire
such as Japan, but a major modernizing Asian power with interna-
tional revolutionary ambitions. The reason for the Albanian defi-
ance of Moscow and its gradual 1957-1960 shift to Peking was the
Albanians " fear and hatred of Yigoslavia, which twice before had
nearly succeeded in not only deposing but--as things go in that
part of the world.- murdering the Leadership of the Albanian Commu-
nist party. Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu naturally had no inten-
tion of running such a risk again. In 1955, Hoxha and Shehu were
convinced, the Soviet Union had been prepared to sacrifice them to
its greater interest in a rapprochement in Yugoslavia; and as Sino-
Soviet differences deepened in the late fifties they believed that
I a
Khrushchev was preparing to do the same thing again. Their choice--
to ally with Peking agains t Moscow-was therefore natural and ra-
tional; and so far It has proved on balance quite successful.
True, the economic damage resulting from the loss of Soviet
aid was very great in Albania--but that was so in China as well,
and the damage is now gradually being repaired in both countries.
The Chinese continue to support Albania, and there appears to be no
reason why they will not do so in the future. (Whether Albania is
following a policy significantly different from China, within an
over-all alliance, remains doubtfulo ) Albanian relations with the
West have been mninimal, in spite of some anticipation in the early
sixties that such reiations m:.ght deve.lop; but Tirana has become
increasingly a center for pro-Chinese and pro-Albanian dissidence
in Western European communism. Finally, Albania is significant be-
cause when direct overt Sino-Sov;tet pclemiCs decine, as in the
month after the fa. of Khrushchev, one can tell from what the
Albanians are saying what the Chinese are thinking: the rapid
resumption of Albantan attacks upon the new So viet leadership first
made clear that Sino-Sovie reconciliation was not in the cards 13
Yugoslavia Is far more complicated. Staiin"s 1948 break with
Tito--Tito most reluctantly became a heretic-realiy began the
revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe The latest Moscow-Belgrade
13. Wil) iamn E. Griffith,, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift
(Cambridge, Mass.-: The M.L T. Press, 1963), passim and. "Sino-Soviet
Relations 1964-1965, " o it'.
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rapprochement probably began secretly in 1958-1959, concomitantly
with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations; it became public
by 1962. By 1965 Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy were largely
aligned, particularly with respect tc the West and underdeveloped
areas.
There were internal Yugoslav reasons why Tito felt it desir-
able to allow his relations with the West to worsen and to improve
his relations with Moscow,, First, the Yugoslav economy tends to
move cyclically from relative prosperity to near-crisis. In 1960
and 1961, and again by 1965, it was in crisis as a result of bad
harvests and industrial, and balance-of-payments difficulties.
Second, Yugoslavia,, like the Soviet Union,, is both anti-German and
anti-Chinese. Third, Tito is over seventy. The succession crisis
in Yugoslavia will probably be the most difficult of any East
European country. Yugoslavia has not one nation but six: the
Serbs, the largest; the Croat, farther to the north; the Sloveni-
ans, the farthest north of alil and to the south the Montenegrins,
Macedonians, and Albanians (half as many as those within the Albani-
an borders). Nationality tensions in Yugoslavia have caused more
blood to flow than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.
These tensions were submerged. by the Communists, in part
genuinely, as the result of popular recoil from the fratricidal
slaughter of the war, and in part also because the Communists
simply suppressed them by police measures. They are, however, re-
emerging rapidly, particularly because, in spite of very large-scale
investments in the underdeveloped areas in the south and east of
Yugoslavia, the economic growth of Slovenia and Croatia has been so
great that the economic gap between the north and south is greater
than it was in 1939. Furthermore, the immense investments in the
south are made at the cost of the Croats and Slovenes to the north,
a fact which in turn gives an economic as well as a religious and.
historical base to the nationalities tensions.
It is often said in Belgrade, and only half jokingly, that
Tito is the only Yugcslav. Half Croat and half Slovene, he suc-
ceeded in identifying himself in the popular consciousness with the
idea of Yugoslavia. But he is almost the only leading Yugoslav
Communist who has. The two major contenders for the succession,
the Serb Rankovic and, the Sicvene Kardeij, are thought of by the
people not as Yugoslavs but as a Serb and a Slovene,, One must
assume, therefore, that nationaiti:es tensions in Yugoslavia will
greatly increase after the depart.ure of Tito from the scene.
In the last year there has been a Counteroffensive of the
Croat and Slovene liberals against Belgrade 's attempt to crack down,
which occurred, in part in order to further the Soviet-Yugoslav
rapprochement, in .1961-1962. There has been very considerable in-
tellectual ferment in Croatia and Slovenia, resulting in the case
of Slovenia in the arrest and imprisonment of several rebellious
writers in the Slovenian capital, L jubljana, and in Croatia in the
Mihajlov case. There has been a strong drive, led by the Communist
leader of Croatia, Vladimir Bakaric, to bring about more economic
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decentralization, thus furthering the autonomy of Slovenia and
Croatia.
It would appear that the 1964 Congress of the Yugoslav Party
was a victory for the liberals. Most recently, the worsening eco-
nomic crisis has led to more econcmic decentralization at home but
is also in large part responsible for the by now almost complete
rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia s only remaining
source of foreign aid. As to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Yugo-
slavs would be in favor of a total break if they felt there were a
serious danger of a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. Since
there is not, they now prefer not to have a total break in order to
retain greater freedom of maneuver,
Among the more rightist or reformist East European regimes,
Poland is exceptional, Although the major gains of 1956 have been
retained (the end of agricultural ccilectivization and of secret
police terror, the uneasy but cont:nuing modus vivendi with the
Roman Catholic Church, and Polish autonomy from Moscow), Gomulka
has otherwise, partic ularly in the more peripheral areas of culture
and (in part) economics, been retreating from liberalization. The
Polish "retreat from October" has many causes- GomuXka's dislike
for intellectuals, his lack of concern for the West, the increasing
1.4. Griffith, The Sinc-Soviet Rift, pp. 182-183; Viktor
Meier, "Yugoslav Communism," in Griffith, Communism in Europe I,
pp. 19-64, and his running coverage in Neue Zircher Zeitung; and
Anatol Shub, "Moscow Summer, Belgrade Winter. The Case of Mihajlo
Mihajlov," Encounter, XXIV, 6 (June 1965), pp. 8,-91.
power of the more extremist party group known as the "Partisans.,"
the economic stagnation of the country, and in general what appears
to be a downward cycle in Polish affairs. Poland is no longer the
freest country in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it is the only
East European country except Yugoslavia where agricultural collec-
tivization remains ended. and where the Roman Catholic Church has
such power. The Poles are unenthusiastic about a Sino-Soviet
break; but their dependence on the Soviet Union (a dependence, by
the way, of any Polish government, because of the necessity of
protecting their western frontier) forbids them to defy the Soviet
Union)
Perhaps the greatest changes in any East European country in
the last five years have occurred in Hungary. In the first place,
Kadar, in 1956 considered. one of the greatest quislings of history,
has performed an amazing job of self-rehabilitation: he has now
achieved relative popularity Hungary today Is probably the freest
country in Eastern Europe, in terms of cultural relaxation, foreign
travel, and the end of mass secret police terror, True, agricul-
tural collectivIzation continues, but the regime has introduced a
kind of sharecrcpping which has greatLy modified it. Hungarian
relations with the West, particularly with West Germany, have
15. Hansjakob Stehle, "Polish. Communism," in Griffith, ed.,
Communism in Europe 1; Anatol Shub from Warsaw in The Washington
Post, June 11 1,965 and H. 'ordon Sk-illing, Communism National
and International (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1964),
pp. 37-52.
improved and at the same time the rise of Romanian nationalism in
Transylvania (the northwestern part of Romania, where more than one
and one-half million Hungarians live), has led to a reappearance of
Hungarian nationalism within Hungary, concentrated., as so often be-
fore, on the Transylvanian question.
As to the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kadar also does not really
want a Sino-Soviet break, but he still depends too much on Soviet
economic aid and troops to be able to defy Moscow. Nevertheless,
/ /
both Gomulka and Kadar demonstrated after Khrushchev's fall their
dislike for the manner in which it had been carried out: their
attitude toward the Soviet Union has thus become, within these
narrow limits, somewhat ambivalent.
What until. recently one would have called the leftist or
extremist leaderships in Eastern Europe, the East Germans, the
Czechs, the Romanians, and, the Bulgarians, have also become very
special cases. To begin with the most exceptional: East Germany--
neither a state nor a nation, neither German nor democratic nor a
republic.o Its Communist regime probably never can be consolidated
as long as West Germany remains so prosperous and powerful.
Ulbricht remains the most hated Communist leader in the world. It
is probable that, if the Soviet troops were withdrawn and the popu-
lation of East Germany were convinced they would not return, Ulbricht
and his associates would be hanging from lamp posts within a few
hours. Nevertheless, as a result of the Berlin Wall and the end of
the East German refugee flow, there has been a certain improvement
418
in the Pankow regime's position. Because of this, because of the
necessity of improving economic productivity and therefore the
necessity of economic reforms, and. because of pressure from Moscow,
there has been since the summer of 1962 a certain limited liberali-
zation in East Germany, primarily in econoncs, moving toward more
decentralization and a greater role for the market and rationalI
prices. There have been also improvements in food supply, in the
situation of the youth, in the system of justice, and, to some
extent, in the cultural field.I
In foreign policy--and this for East Germany means the prob-
lem of German reunification-the situation remains unchanged.
Ulbricht strongly fears any Soviet rapprochement with West Germany;
he must therefore have been rather disquieted in the last months of
Khrushchev's power. Ulbricht does not want a total Sino-Soviet
break. He would like to be able to afford to play a little with
the Chinese, with some of whose policies he sympathizes; but his
total dependence on Soviet troops, his conviction that without them
he is doomed, means that he remains in foreign policy, and largely
in domestic policy as well, a servant of Soviet policy 16 Even so,
he tries to be no more hostile to the Chinese than Moscow insists
upon.
Of the previously neo-Stalinist regimes, by far the greatest
internal changes have occurred in Czechoslovakia. There internal
16. Carola Stern, "East German Communism," in Griffith,
Communism in Europe II; and, Melvin Croan, "The German Problem Once
Again," Survey, No. 55 (April 1965), pp. 171-176.
policy seems now to be in transition from extremist to liberal.
The Czechs have always been cautious. Their last successful revolt
was in 1620; and. it is unlikely, given their long experience in
surviving, that they will soon revolt again. But the Czech economy
is very developed, and by l962-1963 it was in a very major crisis.
The rate of economic growth in Czechoslovakia in 1963 was -Ol per
cent, almost a record for the world-if one excepts Indonesia. Be-
cause of this economic crisis, because of the inability of this
highly-developed country to grow with the system of central plan-
ning, the political leaders of Czechoslovakia, and particularly its
head, Antonin Novotny, have reluctantly felt compelled to listen to
the advice of their economists and to move toward major economic
17
decentralization 1 At the same time and also because of their
need for more foreign currency, they have felt forced to allow a
flood of Western tourists to visit the country. There has also
been a considerable increase in cultural freedom within Czechoslo-
vakia, as well as some signs of the revival of Czech-Slovak rivalry
which plagued the first interwar Czechoslovak Republic.
In spite of all this, Novotny, who was the Stalinist leader
of Czechoslovakia, has survived. True, he has disposed of many of
his associates, and perhaps only by throwing overboard this ballast
has he been able to save himself. But at the present time not only
17. John Michael Montias, "A Plan for all Seasons," Survey,
No. 51 (April 1964), pp. 63-76; and Skilling, o2 cit0 , pp. 102-
105.
-20-
has he survived, but he was apparently sufficiently confident of
his own strength so that after the fall of Khrushchev he indicated
more public displeasure than almost any other East European leader.
He reportedly refused to go to Moscow for the October Revolution
celebration, the onl y East European Leader whc did so--a step which
has, of course, given him greater popularity in the country.
Czechoslovakia may well, slowly and cautiously, try to imitate
Romania's new foreign policy, at least in partc0 ,
There have also been stirrings, albeit of a different kind,
in Bulgaria. The Soviet Union is back in the Balkans where the
Tsar was In 1880: it can rely at most on Bulgaria. Bulgaria has
also carried out extensive decentralization of its economy, and
some Bulgarian econoini sts have exhibited a certain degree of ideo-
logical economic revisionism Much more importantly, in the spring
of 1965 the Sofia regime unccvered and crushed a politico-military
conspiracy against it-the first time that any East European Com-
munist army was even partially involved in an antiregime conspiracy.
The conspirators were basically nationalist in orientation, not
pro-Chinese, and most of them had a wartime partisan background.
Although crushed, the conspiracy showed the weakness of the Zhivkov
regime. Out of tradition, out of the weakness of the present Bul-
garian regime, out of the need it feels for protection against the
1.8. Viktor Meier, "Die Tschechoslowakei am Kreuzweg," Neue
Zuircher Zeitung, June 6, June 2r, and July 8, 1965.
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rebellious Yugoslavs and Romanians, Bulgaria remains, as it did in
1880, a satellite of Russia; but the unsuccessful coup showed that
even in Sofia Soviet control is neither certain nor necessarily
permament. 19
Romania is by far the most interesting country in Eastern
Europe. As has been pointed out before, recent research has indi-
cated that the beginnings of Romanian dissent go back to 1958. The
documentation available for this early period is entirely economic;
it concerns the Romanian rejection of multilateral economic integra-
tion within CMEA, a mcve caused primarily by Bucharest's justified
fear that it would profit only the countries already industrialized,
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, while Romania would remain prima-
rily a source of raw materials, an economic colony of the Soviet
Union and of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which the Romanians
are no more likely to accept than is any other economically colo-
nized underdeveloped country. Romania is by far the wealthiest
country in Eastern Europe, not only because of its timber and
agricultural products but also because of its very major resources
in oil and natural gas. It has therefore substantial resources to
build its own industrialized economic base, and it is determined to
use them to do so,
19. J. F. Brown. "The Bulgarian Plot," The World Today, XII,
6 (June 1965), pp. 261-268; Viktor Meier, "Die Verschworung in
Bulgarien," Neue Z"rcher Zeitung, April. 29, 1965, and "Der
Umsturzversuch in Bulgarien, " ibid, May 2, 1965; and o k.,
"Undurchsichtige Vorg'inge in Bulgarien," ibid., April 23, 1965.
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The Romanian differences with the Soviet Union have not been
only economic; they have historical and political causes as well.
The Romanians have always been anti-Slav and anti Russian More=
over, in 1940 the Soviet Union unilaterally annexed the northern
part of Romania, Bessarabia and Bukovina, a move which sti rankles
in Romanian hearts. Furthermore, the present Communist leadership
of Romania is alriost entirely "native"; it is comp ed of people
who did not spend, the interwar period cr the Second World War In
Moscow, and it is almost entirely ethnicaly Roranian in origino
(Most top Hungarian, Ukrainian, or Jewish Communists were purged n
1952-1957,,) The Romanian Communist leaders saw their opportuni t y
in the Sino-Soviet dispute; and they have kncwn how m
iantly between Moscow and Peking. (Such dancing on a tightrope
is nothing new in Romanian history: the Romanians changed sides
in the First and Second World Wars at just the right tim and wth
very favorable results,)
As became publicly and totally clear i its declaraton of
April 1964, the Romaniran leadership has adopted, a modified national
communism. Its partial break with Moscow ha- ledt an improvent
of its relations with the West and with. its oI popuatin, to the
release, for example, of political prisoners and to an increasing
degree of cu.tural liberalization. Nevertheless, Romania s naion
al communism fundamentally reflects the desire of brlantly, if
treacherously5 successful bureaucrats to run their own affairs and,
to play with all sides for their own benefit: to have god relatio
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with Peking, Moscow, Belgrade, Bonn, Paris, London, and Washington--
with everybody, that is, except Hungary, where the Transylvanian
problem makes this impossible. In spite of Romania's refusal to
attend the March 1965 18-party conference, its relations with
Moscow remain correct, and those with Belgrade and Warsaw excellent.
The Romanians have now probably the best position they have
ever had in their history, They can balance not only against their
immediate neighbor and against the West on the one hand and the
Russians on the cther, but they can also balance the Russians
against the Chinese2
Finally, what of the most recent developments? After Khru-
shchev's fall quite a few of the East European parties, the Poles,
the Czechs, the East Germans, and the Hungarians, publicly indicated
their dislike for the way his removal was handled, a dislike made
clearest by Novctn"s refusal to go o Moscow. It is increasingly
clear that Khrushchevxs fall and h successors' indecision, divi-
sion, and dilemrma in Vietnam have greatly dimini shed the already
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declIning Sov, et prest ge in Eastern Europe.
What, then, are the factors which characterize the East
Eurcpean c _- -day? The downgrading of the secret police and the
deciline cf mass error both within and without the party make it
easier for Ihe intelligentsia, particularly managerial and ecocnoic
ones, and ehrder for the party apparat This. plus economic devel>
opment, lead tow ard the decline of the decisive superiority of th
party apra over various competing elites. There are, of
limits to this .teralization; and It is impcrtant to nderstand
oth hcw far l relizat-ion has gone and. 'ts limis!
Aarth 13 oaan Revo1 utIon demonstrat ed. he Scvi;ets prota-
bly are til u nwilling to allow the derunciation of a forma:
mt al e w the Soviet Union- Yet Altania and ugoslav.a
are nct a ed with the Scviet Union in any effctive military sens
and :n. mus at least pcse the ques t ion ,whether the Romanian in
rae t rmain sa The Sove t Union wuld proval also not allow th
owIca abanonnt of Marxis-Leninist ideolog the end of Commu-
nit eeonya and of a one-party state, b one can keep the
id.eoogy and a o reCd.fine t-as, for example, th Yugos.lavs did-
that in part it comCes rev'isionist and thus ncreasingly likely
to infect its neighbors.
Then there is the evolution within the apparat itself: the
decline in the power of the agitprop and of the purely party
apparatchiki, the increase In the power of econcric technicians,
and, he moving toward power of a new, postwar generation. The
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Communist elites of Eastern Europe are increasingly modernizing,
anti-Soviet, nationalistic, anti-Western, and anti-democratic.
What was Communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe is becoming
more authoritarian in character. Mass terror is becoming excep-
tional. There are greater areas of autonomy for non-party elites.
There is a gradual change from the atmosphere of ideological
struggle and revolution from above to more pragmatic and economic
goals. Finally, there is increased independence from Moscow.
This re-emergence of national identities in Eastern Europe
will not soon probably produce democracy. It will, however, proba-
bly lead to some, albeit limited,, liberalization, but above all to
the nationalization and bureaucratization of the East European
dictatorships.
